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1 
A quarter century after the last major legal-
ization in the United States, there is much 
evidence and a growing consensus that our 
current immigration system is unworkable 
and in serious need of reform. One of the 
proposed solutions has been the creation 
of a Biometric Enrollment, Locally-stored 
Information, and Electronic Verification of 
Employment (BELIEVE) card that would 
be mandatory for anyone—citizen or non-
citizen—employed in a U.S. workplace. 
This plan was initially offered as part of a 
bi-partisan proposal on comprehensive 
immigration reform and is likely to be part 
of future comprehensive reform discus-
sions. This paper analyzes the costs and 
unintended consequences of such a pro-
posal. Our analysis shows that the BELIEVE 
system cannot achieve its goal of preventing 
unauthorized employment.
We estimate that establishing a biometric 
employment card would cost almost $40 
billion at the outset, with ongoing mainte-
nance costs of at least $3 billion per year. 
Requiring all working Americans to get this
identity card would fundamentally trans-
form the information demands the United 
States government places on its citizens. The 
cards would be unreliable and inadequate 
to prevent fraud; would lead to privacy viola-
tions; and would place undue burdens on 
the poor. At the same time, the BELIEVE 
cards would likely be ineffective in targeting 
the employment of unauthorized migrants.
We recommend that rather than spending 
tens of billions of dollars on an expen-
sive, intrusive and ineffective program, the 
government examine the root causes of 
unauthorized migration and employment. 
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), touting 
the new law as a solution to the employment 
of unauthorized immigrants. More than two 
decades of experience suggests that IRCA 
has been unable to prevent the employment 
of unauthorized workers and policymakers 
are once again searching for quick fixes. 
The BELIEVE system is not the answer; it 
will cost us dearly at a time when we can 
least afford it.
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1. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(a)(2) (2010), U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigration Servs., Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, available  at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf.
2. See  USA v. Snack Attack Deli, Inc., 10 OCAHO no. 1137 (Dec. 22, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/eoirOcahoMain/publisheddecisions/Looseleaf/Volume10/1137.pdf.
3. E-Verify: Preserving Jobs for American Workers 2011: Hearing Before House Comm. 
on the Judiciary and Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (written testimony of Theresa C. Bertucci, Associate Director, 
Enterprise Services Directorate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services). 
E-Verify has struggled with erroneous and obsolete entries in the databases 
on which it relies, together with other obstacles to good performance; we 
discuss these in more detail later in this paper.
4. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 
(2011). 
5. Senators Reid, Durbin, Schumer, Leahy, Feinstein and Menendez 
described the proposed  BELIEVE system on April 29, 2010, in a document 
initially labeled “Conceptual Proposal for Immigration Reform,” available 
under the title “Real Enforcement with Practical Answers for Immigration Reform 
(REPAIR) Proposal” at www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=31851.
6. The Conceptual Proposal, supra note 5, does not specify 
which biometric would be encoded on the card. Knowledgeable 
congressional staffers, however, indicated last year that the plan con-
templated the use of either fingerprints or hand vein scans. We 
assume the use of one of those two biometrics in this analysis.
BACKGROUND
Before 1986, the federal government did not require 
employers to verify that workers were authorized to work in 
the United States. Congress established the current 
employer verification requirement in the 1986 Immigrant 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA).  That statute also created 
a system of sanctions to punish employers who knowingly 
hired undocumented workers.  Whenever a U.S. employer 
hires a new worker, the worker must display identification 
establishing his identity and showing that he is authorized 
to work in the U.S. – either because he is a citizen, or 
because he is a noncitizen (such as a green card holder, an 
asylum recipient, or a holder of certain temporary visas) 
whose immigration status entitles him to work. Some of the 
documents workers typically provide to establish their 
identity are driver’s licenses, U.S. passports, and green 
cards. Some of the documents workers typically provide to 
establish their work authorization are U.S. social security 
cards, U.S. birth certificates or passports for citizens, and 
green cards or other U.S. immigration documents for 
noncitizens.1
 The employer must keep records of that 
documentation in a form called the I-9. Employers need 
not seek documentation from, or fill out I-9s for, people 
who are legally classified as independent contractors rather 
than employees.
 The Obama Administration has greatly expanded 
enforcement of I-9 requirements in the past three years, 
sharply increasing audits (so-called “silent raids”) of employ-
ers’ I-9 files.  In FY 2010, ICE fined employers about $7 
million for I-9 violations, ten times as much as in 2008. Some 
targets have been small (as in one case where ICE sought to 
fine a small Subway franchisee over $100,000 for I-9 viola-
tions, notwithstanding that there was no evidence the 
business had actually hired an unauthorized worker);2 
others have been large (audit targets have included clothing 
retailers Abercrombie & Fitch and American Apparel).
 The U.S. government has also established a program 
called E-Verify through which employers can seek to verify 
new hires’ employment eligibility electronically, by check-
ing the employees’ names, social security numbers, and 
other identifying information against Department of 
Homeland Security and the Social Security Administration 
databases. Federal law makes participation in E-Verify 
mandatory for federal contractors, but voluntary other-
wise; about 11% of employers use it nationwide.3 Some 
states, such as Arizona, have enacted laws making partici-
pation mandatory for employers in the state; the Supreme 
Court has recently ruled that Arizona’s law does not con-
flict with the federal employment verification system 
established by IRCA.4
 The BELIEVE plan’s backers propose to replace current 
verification systems with a new system under which every 
worker in the United States would have to apply for and 
receive a high-tech ID card.5  In order to get the card, the 
worker would have to submit documents demonstrating his 
identity and work authorization. He would also have to sub-
mit to the federal government a biometric identifier, such as 
fingerprints or a scan of the veins in the back of his hand.6 
The federal government would encrypt the worker’s biomet-
ric information on his card.
 Under the BELIEVE scheme, each worker would have 
to present that card to his employer. The employer (or a 
separate private credential checking bureau, charging the 
employer for the service) would then have to fingerprint 
the employee or scan his hand, and would have to use 
high-tech equipment to check the employee’s biometric 
against the information encrypted on the card. Assuming 
the employee’s biometric matched the one on his card, the 
employer would then have to transmit the employee’s 
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identity to a massive centralized database, maintained by 
the federal government, of people allowed to work in the 
United States—including citizens, green card holders, 
asylees/refugees, holders of a wide range of temporary 
visas, and members of a variety of other immigration cate-
gories.  If for any reason the federal government then 
reported that the person was not entitled to work, that per-
son would be prohibited from working and would have to 
file an appeal with the federal government.
 Imagine, thus, that Sally Stephens, born 41 years ago 
in Flint, Michigan, has been working for sixteen years as a 
forklift operator for Wilbur Industries.  If the BELIEVE 
proposal became law, she would have to report to a govern-
ment office with documents establishing who she is and 
that she is authorized to work in the United States.  The 
government would examine those documents and supple-
ment them by “engag[ing] in background screening 
verification techniques currently used by private corpora-
tions.”7 A federal government employee at that office 
would take her fingerprints (or a scan of the veins in the 
back of her hand); the government would then issue her a 
worker authorization card with her biometric information 
in encrypted form. This identity verification and biometric 
capture process would take place more than 150 million 
times in the start-up period, as the government issued 
cards to every American worker.
 Sally (along with 150 million other American workers) 
would have to present that card to her current employer(s), 
and to every future employer.  The employer would use 
equipment on its own premises (or those of a third-party 
credential bureau) to check Sally’s fingerprints or other 
biometric again, and make sure they matched those on the 
card.  Assuming the biometrics matched, the employer 
would then check Sally’s work authorization against the 
master government database. If Sally’s biometric failed to 
match that on the card (perhaps because of a fingerprint 
error when the card was made), or the master database 
erroneously reported her as unauthorized to work, she 
would have to apply to the government bureaucracy to get 
the problem fixed before being allowed to work again.
I. ThE BELIEVE SYSTEM WOULD BE  
PROhIBITIVELY COSTLY
The Social Security Administration has estimated that it 
will require $10 billion to create a biometric social security 
card, an approach similar to the BELIEVE scheme. That 
estimate is egregiously low. Our analysis indicates that it 
would cost almost $40 billion to establish the BELIEVE sys-
tem (including both direct costs to the federal government 
and hidden costs imposed on employers and workers), and 
another $3 billion annually to maintain it. (See Figure 1)
7. “Conceptual Proposal,” supra note 5, at 10.
8. Social Security Number High Risk Issues Hearing Before Subcomm. on Social Secu-
rity of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. (2006) (statement 
of Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Program 
Policy, Social Security Admin.) available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/
testimony_031606a.html.
FIGUrE 1  |  Costs and revenue for  
                        BELIEVE Bio-Id System
Initial annual
(in millions)
Costs
Costs to 
the Government
(hardware, identity 
systems, E-Verify 
expansion, staff 
capacity, biomentric 
ID cards for citizen 
workers)
$22,626 $2,055
Costs to Employers
(biometric scanner, 
training, third party 
verification services)
$5,574 $211
Productivity Costs
(loss of worker 
productivity and 
addressing federal 
government and/or 
employer/third-party 
verification errors)
$11,757 $884
total Costs $39,957 $3,150
revenue
Fees for Biometic 
Id Cards 
(collected from 
employers, noncitizen 
workers, and legal 
permanent residents)
$1,794 $217
total revenue $1,794 $217
Net Costs (Costs minus revenue)1 $38,163 $2,933
1.  This cost chart relies upon conservative estimates. See detailed 
cost charts in appendix for a range of estimates.
Note: Subtotals may not sum to totals due to rounding.
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9. See infra note 25 & accompanying text. 
10. See 2010 Census: A Status Update of Key Decennial Operations, Before the Sub-
comm. on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services 
and International Security Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
United States Senate (February 23, 2010) (statement of Robert M. Groves 
Director US Census Bureau) available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/pdf/Groves_Senate_Testimony_2-23-10.pdf.
11. See European Commission Joint Research Centre, “Biometrics at the 
Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society,” EUR 21585 EN (2005), avail-
able at http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?prs=1235; Hear-
ing Before the House Comm. On Homeland Security on TSA’s Transpor-
tation Worker Identification Credential Program, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(testimony of Judith Marks, President, Lockheed Martin Transportation 
and Security Solutions) available at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocu-
ments/20071031111059-74695.pdf. (hereinafter “Testimony of Judith Marks”)
12. See Testimony of Judith Marks, supra note 11. 
To be effective, a worker ID system must have 100% 
participation. The proposal contemplates that all employ-
ers will be required to establish that all their employees 
have the legal right to be employed. The only way to 
require employers to verify all their workers is to ensure 
that anyone who has a right to be employed can be reliably 
checked. An employer cannot be expected to demand a 
card from a prospective worker, and certainly cannot be 
penalized for failing to check the card, unless all eligible 
workers already have the cards and the infrastructure for 
card verification is in place. Nor would it work for the law 
to require only that noncitizens produce a card: in that 
situation, noncitizens could masquerade as citizens and 
thus circumvent the card requirement. So employers must 
demand cards from citizens and noncitizens alike, just as 
they demand I-9 documentation today from citizens and 
noncitizens. The upshot is that before mandatory verifica-
tion can begin the government must:
• authorize an adequately staffed and funded government 
agency to implement the ID card system;
• issue rules and regulations on methods for updating 
data, appealing denials of applications, and replacing 
lost or stolen cards;
• create the national database to which those card readers 
will be connected;
• distribute (or sell) card readers to 7.4 million 
workplaces;
• verify the identity of, and issue cards to approximately 
150 million workers; 
• be prepared to respond to the same number 
of requests for verification in the start-up 
period alone.
About 156 million people are in the United States work-
force, and would need cards. In order to succeed, the card 
must have multiple levels of security.  It needs to be diffi-
cult to counterfeit; it has to be hardened against improper 
attempts to access biometric data in order to minimize the 
risk of identity theft; and it needs to be tamperproof so that 
a card cannot be modified to incorporate a different per-
son’s biometric identifiers.
 Biometric identification makes card issuance time-
consuming and expensive. Every individual’s application 
for a card would be an in-person transaction. The govern-
ment will have to establish a network of thousands of card 
issuance offices nationwide, presumably by going to exist-
ing government offices (such as post offices) and installing 
new equipment, adding and training new staff, and allocat-
ing physical space for these operations. While vein scanning 
is a new and untested technology for which little data is 
available,9 we know that training people to take finger-
prints is not a trivial endeavor. The U.S. Census Bureau 
recently had to fingerprint all its census-takers; it trained 
staff people in fingerprint-taking for two hours, and even 
so 20% of the prints they took failed.10 Live scan technol-
ogy which produces digitized fingerprints would improve 
those rates, but with any fingerprint technology there is 
reason to expect unreadable-print rates as high as 4-5%,11 
and no lower than 1.5-2% in the best of circumstances.12 
Assuming an error rate of 2% in connection with worker 
IDs, approximately three million people would have bad 
prints taken.  If those were entered into worker ID cards, 
all of those people would become unemployable until they 
rectified the situation.
 The federal government could perhaps off-load some 
costs onto state governments by assigning the card applica-
tion process and biometric capture to state DMV offices. 
This would shift the costs from one budget to another, but 
it would not significantly reduce them; state DMV employ-
ees have no equipment or training for fingerprint or hand 
vein capture. Rather, assigning the work to state DMV 
departments would simply impose an unfunded mandate. 
Cash-strapped states would then face a choice between 
expending funds to hire additional workers to cope with 
the surge of new duties, or using the existing workforce. 
Not adding workers means imposing more wasted time 
waiting in line for the people applying for driver’s licenses, 
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13. See Technical Appendix to this report.
14. Our cost estimate assumes that employers with fewer than 500 employees 
will save money by using a third-party verification service, rather than buying 
biometric equipment and training employees in-house.
15. See discussion regarding errors in the E-Verify system. infra note 21
16. See Technical Appendix to this report.
a significant social cost that does not show up on state bal-
ance sheets. A similar choice—more government 
expenditure or more costs imposed on people waiting lon-
ger in line—would apply if the job were done in federal 
post office facilities.
 We estimate that direct costs to government covering 
such items as hardware and staff training for biometric cap-
ture, establishing needed birth and death registration 
systems, scaling up the E-Verify infrastructure, and dissemi-
nating educational materials, together with the costs of the 
cards themselves, will exceed $22 billion for the initial roll-
out of the program. They will impose an additional $2 
billion annually in ongoing costs.13 These direct costs to 
the government, however, are only the beginning.
 The BELIEVE plan contemplates that before an 
employer could hire a new worker, the employer would 
have to check his or her ID, and confirm that the person 
proffering the ID was the same person it was issued to. In 
order to do this, the employer would need a biometric 
scanner.14 If the finger or hand the worker submitted to 
the scanner matches the biometric encoded on the card, 
the scanner connects to a central government database to 
confirm that the person has a right to work.
 The costs of this card-checking infrastructure will be 
large: Because the biometric data will be encoded on the 
card, the card-checking devices will need decryption capa-
bilities. What’s more, they will need to be sufficiently 
hardened to prevent anyone from cracking the code and 
extracting the biometric data, which would create a risk of 
biometrically-enhanced identity theft for the card holder. 
In addition, businesses owning scanners would have to 
train employees to use them. Most workers will have to take 
time off work to get their cards—another real cost.
 Because some information (such as name or immigra-
tion status) stored on the card could change, there will 
need to be a system for routinely updating information. 
Because workers’ cards will be lost or stolen, there will 
need to be a system for card replacement.
 The federal government will need a system for manual 
verification and investigation when the automated system 
reports that a biometric doesn’t match or that an 
individual isn’t authorized to work. Anyone rejected for an 
ID card, or anyone who presents a valid card but is accused 
of not being the person to whom the card really belongs 
(say, due to an erroneous fingerprint mis-match), must 
have a quick and effective means of correcting the mistake. 
As we will detail later, there is strong reason to expect fre-
quent errors in each of these categories. Error correction 
will entail substantial costs both to the government and to 
workers themselves.  Consider that today, when the E-Verify 
system gives workers a “tentative nonconfirmation” notice 
—a warning that government databases report they are not 
authorized to work—the workers need to make time in 
order to attempt to resolve the database error. The error 
correction costs of the BELIEVE program will be substan-
tially greater than E-Verify’s15, because BELIEVE will have 
to address biometric errors as well as database errors.
 Under the BELIEVE plan, every biometric or database 
error will mean a lost job, and lost wages, until the error 
can be fixed and the worker employed. Even our most con-
servative estimates suggest that the bill for lost wages due to 
errors will be billions of dollars at the outset, and more 
than $65 million each year thereafter. We estimate that the 
productivity costs to employers and workers of acquiring 
cards, and remedying errors, for every employee in the 
U.S. workforce, together with the direct costs to employers 
for verification, will be in the range of $12 to $18 billion for 
the initial rollout alone. Ongoing costs will be in the neigh-
borhood of $1 billion yearly.16
our own conservative estimates, 
summing to a little more than  
$40 billion for the BeLieVe 
program’s initial rollout, may 
significantly underestimate 
its costs.
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 An alternative starting point for estimating total direct 
costs comes from the UK. A few years ago, the British gov-
ernment proposed a biometric ID card for the entire adult 
population of that country. (The new Conservative-Liberal 
Democratic government has since abandoned the plan as 
“wasteful, bureaucratic and intrusive.”17) A London School 
of Economics report assessed ten-year rollout costs for that 
country’s biometric ID card program at $10-30 billion.18 
Multiplying that estimate by a factor of three (to reflect the 
fact that the UK plan was planned to cover a mere 50 mil-
lion adults, one-third the size of the U.S. workforce19) 
would yield a corresponding US estimate of $30-90 billion. 
The midpoint of that range—$60 billion—is about one-
eighth of total annual nondefense discretionary spending 
in the federal budget.
 It should be noted, though, that the UK plan contem-
plated a much smaller reader network than the BELIEVE 
plan would require; in addition to having a much larger 
population, the land area of the United States is more than 
40 times greater than that of the UK.  Thus, U.S. costs for 
a network of verification locations would have to be sub-
stantially higher. This suggests that our own conservative 
estimates, summing to little more than $40 billion for the 
BELIEVE program’s initial rollout, may significantly under-
estimate its costs.
II. ThE CARD WILL BE UNRELIABLE
The appeal of the BELIEVE plan is the idea that American 
employers will be able to consult a trouble-free, reliable, 
fraud-proof card that can tell them with assurance whether 
the person standing before them is authorized to work. 
The BELIEVE plan will not do that.
a. data Quality
In issuing cards to U.S. citizens and others, the govern-
ment will be relying on information derived from existing 
databases for its judgments as to who is authorized to work 
and who is not. No matter how good the security on the 
cards, the system results will be unreliable if government 
databases cannot accurately report which individuals are in 
fact authorized to work. The extensive inaccuracies in cur-
rent DHS and SSA databases, though, are well-documented. 
According to the Social Security Administration (SSA), 
there are errors in approximately 17.8 million records in 
the NUMIDENT database used to check employment eligi-
bility status. About 13 million of those incorrect records 
belong to U.S. citizens.20 A recent DHS report found that 
the E-Verify system had no more than 54% success in 
detecting unauthorized workers.21 Anecdotal reports sug-
gest that the system’s error rate in dealing with authorized 
workers, while lower, is still quite high.22 While the DHS 
report cheerily claims that the system finds only 0.8% of 
authorized workers to be unauthorized,23 application of 
even that statistic to the overall U.S. workforce would mean 
that over a million authorized U.S. workers would incor-
rectly be found to be working illegally.
 These error rates will likely have a disproportionate 
effect on legitimate foreign-born workers and the indus-
tries that tend to employ them. For example, Intel 
Corporation’s E-Verify queries in 2008 resulted in nearly 
13 percent of Intel employees being initially flagged as 
even a 1% error rate would still result 
in almost 1.5 million citizens and other 
legal workers being falsely accused of 
being undocumented aliens.
17. PA, Identity Cards to be Scrapped Within 100 Days, THE INDEPENDENT 
[small caps], may 27, 2010,, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/new-
suk/politics/identity-cards-to-be-scrapped-within-100-days-1984447.html 
(quoting Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg).
18. London School of Economics, An Assessment of the UK Identity Cards Bill and 
its Implications, The Identity Project, 2005, available at http://is2.lse.ac.uk/id-
card/identityreport.pdf. 
19. We assume a linear relationship but understand that there would likely be 
economies of scale.
20. Congressional Response Report: Accuracy of the Social Security Administra-
tion’s Numident File (Office of the Inspector General, Social Security Adminis-
tration, Dec. 2006), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF 
audittxt/A-08-06-26100.htm (“we estimate that of the approximately 380 million 
native-born U.S. citizen records in the Numident file, about 12.7 million contain 
discrepant information that may result in incorrect Basic Pilot feedback.”).
21. Westat, Findings of the E-Verify Program Evaluation, (Dec. 2009), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final E-Verify 
Report 12-16-09_2.pdf, at ¶1.5.3. (hereinafter “Westat”)
22. See National Immigration Law Center, E-Verify: Why Mandatory Employer 
Participation Will Stall Economic Growth And Job Creation, 2010, available at http://
www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/e-verify-facts-2010-02-17.pdf.
23. Westat, supra note 21, at ¶1.5.3.
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unauthorized, all of whom were found to be authorized 
after a lengthy process. Under the BELIEVE plan, prob-
lems caused by erroneous or inaccurate information in 
U.S. databases could happen at multiple stages. An 
improper rejection could appear at the front end—when a 
U.S. citizen or authorized noncitizen queued up for a card 
and had his fingerprints or vein scan taken, only to be told 
that the computer did not recognize his work eligibility. 
A false rejection could also happen at the time a worker 
presented his card on starting a new job: if the initial work 
authorization was based on conditional lawful permanent 
resident status or a nonimmigrant visa, he would have 
to rely on the government data being updated correctly 
for the system to continue to recognize his status. Poor 
government record-keeping —which has been endemic in 
the relevant databases so far—would mean an erroneous 
rejection.  Similarly, old records could easily lead to incor-
rect work authorization for a noncitizen whose visa status 
had lapsed. Those lawfully authorized workers who are 
incorrectly rejected would have to remain unemployed 
until their case worked its way through a bureaucratic 
appeals process.
B. Biometric Error
Proponents of the BELIEVE  proposal do not specify the 
nature of the biometric the card would use, but congres-
sional staff last year indicated that the plan contemplated 
the use of fingerprint or vein scan technologies. Either one 
would require expensive equipment and trained person-
nel. Even a very small error rate would have devastating 
effects on the workforce, and impose immense costs on the 
government. Suppose, for example, that scanners were 
99% accurate. That 1% error rate would result in almost 
1.5 million citizens and other legal workers being falsely 
accused of being undocumented aliens.
 As we have already noted, U.S. experience with finger-
print scanners in the field has generated substantial error 
rates. In a best-case analysis, one should expect unread-
able-print rates of at least 1.5-2%, and possibly as high as 
4-5%.24 Nor is that the end of the problem. Some people 
do not have fingerprints due to birth defects, skin diseases, 
or accidents; others do not even have fingers. Persons 
engaged in certain farming or industrial occupations that 
can cause significant dermal abrasion may suffer from scar-
ring or wear which causes their fingerprints to appear 
changed to fingerprint readers. Dealing with these and 
other exceptional cases in an expeditious manner will 
require complex and expensive infrastructure.
 Vein scanning is a new and relatively untried technol-
ogy, with promising but still largely untested applications. 
While it’s possible that the error rate for vein scan technol-
ogy may be lower, at this stage of our understanding of the 
technology any such assumption would be risky. All 
reported work carried out to date on hand vein biometrics 
has involved relatively small databases collected by 
researchers working for the vein scanning technology ven-
dors. “It is therefore not possible to… predict the likely 
false acceptance and false rejection rates that might be 
expected of hand vein biometrics.”25 In sum, there is no 
documented basis for believing that any biometric technol-
ogy will be able reliably to match cardholders to cards 
without problematic error or failure rates.
C. Fraud
The BELIEVE plan’s biometric requirement is designed to 
ensure that the worker presenting an ID card to an 
employer is the same person to whom the card was issued. 
But it does not ensure that the person applying for an ID 
card is using her own name, rather than a stolen or false 
identity. The plan does require card applicants to present 
identity documents such as drivers’ licenses. It is likely 
therefore that the market in false documents will shift to 
providing  underlying documents in a false or stolen name. 
As a National Academy of Sciences report has explained, 
“even the most secure documents issued by the U.S. gov-
ernment… have been forged with regularity”;26  fraudulently 
acquiring or forging less-secure documents, such as birth 
certificates and drivers licenses, and then using them to 
acquire more secure ones, such as passports, is even 
easier.27 The GAO recently released a report demonstrating 
24. See supra note 9-10 and accompanying text.
25. Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain, EncyclopEdia of BiomEtrics 692 (2009).
26. Stephen Kent and Lynette Millet (eds.), ids - not that Easy: QuEstions 
aBout nationwidE idEntity systEms Committee on Authentication Tech-
nologies and their Privacy Implications, Computer Science and Telecom-
munications Board (CSTB), Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, 
National Research Council (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.
php?record_id=10346#toc, 38.
27. James Waldo, Herbert Lin and Lynette Millet (eds.), Engaging privacy 
and information tEchnology in a digital agE, Committee on Privacy in the 
Information Age, CSTB, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, Na-
tional Research Council (2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.
php?record_id=11896, 268.
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how easy it is to get a U.S. passport using fraudulent docu-
mentation.28 Even the highest degree of technological 
protections designed to keep the card itself secure will not 
stop a person from being able to get a card using false ini-
tial documentation. There is no assurance that a worker 
whose biometric matches a valid card is thus in fact an 
authorized worker.
 One important potential avenue for the generation of 
false cards lies in the fact that any system must have a way 
of replacing lost credentials; fraudsters will therefore be 
able to impersonate real and existing workers. BELIEVE 
plan backers propose to store biometrics only on the ID 
card, not in the central registry. But that means when an 
imposter shows up and claims to be “John Smith of 1234 
Main St., CT” the only check will be the documents prof-
fered.  If they have been stolen (or rented) from the real 
John Smith, the fake John Smith can get a credential with 
his own biometrics. Ironically, in some cases, the fake John 
Smith may have more evidence of being the real John 
Smith than the actual one.
III. ThE BELIEVE PLAN WOULD BURDEN ThE POOR
The BELIEVE Plan will amount in the long run to a work 
tax: the law will impose costs (and delays) every time some-
one wants to take a new job. This tax will fall hardest on the 
poorest, and especially hard on casual labor hires, since 
they receive among the lowest wages, are hired for the 
shortest period of time and experience high job turnover. 
In order to follow the law’s requirements and get a card, 
workers will need to get their identity papers in order. But 
the people who least have their papers in order tend to be 
the poorest, most ill, or most in need of employment. The 
very people one would want to avoid hurting—homeless 
persons, for example—are the ones most likely to be 
harmed by a system that will in effect make them 
unemployable.
 If the plan were to provide that day laborers, say, 
should be treated as employees and required to present 
ID, it is hard to imagine how the program would work. By 
the time day laborers finished being approved by a local 
third party ID verifier, a good chunk of the workday will be 
over. But if ID verification required biometric capture and 
Internet access, how would these facilities be available on 
farms, or on trucks, or at casual (street-corner) labor 
recruitment sites? More generally, if these requirements 
are imposed on casual labor, then, as the cost of verifica-
tion begins to approach their daily wage, it is hard to see 
how casual labor will remain economical at all. 
Nor is it clear how the plan would apply to domestic 
workers, companions, babysitters, and others hired by 
household employers.
IV. ThE BELIEVE PLAN WOULD WEAKEN  
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
The BELIEVE proposal emphasizes that security features 
should protect the information stored on the card. Yet 
the history of similar technology teaches that the cards’ 
encryption scheme would be broken soon enough.29 
Once the encryption system on the ID card is broken, or 
the master decryption key leaks or is reverse engineered, 
then all extant ID cards will become vulnerable to anyone 
with the right sort of scanner. As the U.S. government 
puts more resources into building and enabling access to 
its national registry of legal workers—which will have data 
on almost every adult citizen and legal resident—it will 
create a single point of failure for identity theft on a mas-
sive scale. There have already been instances of 
employment eligibility verification data accidentally 
being released to the public;30 more generally, govern-
ment and private company data breaches are frequent, 
and sometimes massive. From 2000 to 2008 state and fed-
eral government agencies exposed or mishandled about 
530 million state and federal records containing personal 
data.31 Exposure or hacking of this data could have cata-
strophic consequences for individual data privacy.
28. Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance Process Remains Vulnerable to 
Fraud: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and Subcomm. on Ter-
rorism and Homeland Security, 11th Cong. (2010), (statement of Gregory Kutz, 
Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items d10922t.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Global RFID passport encryption standard hacked within two hours by a 
Dutch company rfid gazEttE, Feb. 4, 2006, available at http://www.rfidgazette.
org/2006/02/global_rfid_pas.html.
30. Sasha Aslanian, Warnings Issued After Possible Security Breach, minnEsota 
puBlic radio nEws, Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://minnesota.publicradio.
orgdisplay/web/2009/12/11/security-breach.
31. Jay Cline, 530M Records Exposed, and Counting, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 
9, 2008, available at http:www.computerworld.com/s/article/9114176/530M_ 
records_exposed_and_counting.
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V. ThE BELIEVE PLAN WOULD UNDERMINE FREEDOM
The Fourth Amendment ensures that people will “be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” While the 
law in this area is complex and studded with exceptions, 
as a general matter the Fourth Amendment protects 
against invasions of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
by a search or seizure. Americans today have a reasonable 
expectation that they will not be fingerprinted or other-
wise subject to biometric capture unless they are suspects 
in a crime or seeking a position of particular responsibil-
ity such as that of an intelligence officer, a police officer, 
or someone who works with young children.
 The Supreme Court has approved some searches for 
non-law enforcement purposes32 if the search program’s 
primary purpose constitutes a special need beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement, and outweighs the pri-
vacy interest at stake and the character of the intrusion.33 
Although the courts have greatly broadened the “special 
needs” exception in the last decade, no program to which 
it has been applied was anywhere as large as the national 
reach of a proposal to fingerprint (or vein scan) 156 mil-
lion people. This would be a radical new weakening of the 
Fourth Amendment.
 Finally, although the proposed framework limits the 
use of the card for purposes other than employment veri-
fication, there is no way to control future legislation. 
Employment eligibility verification is not all that this card 
is likely to be used for. Mission creep—the tendency of a 
bureaucratic project to expand beyond its original pur-
poses—is an inevitable part of any government program. 
When the Social Security Card was invented, Congress 
legislated—and the card itself warned—that it should not 
be used for identification. Now the SSN is ubiquitous. 
The same will undoubtedly be the fate of this “hardened 
Social Security Card”: it will become necessary for access 
first to government programs, and then to private 
transactions. The creation of a card and a database that 
control each individual’s right to work will give the gov-
ernment new leverage over all citizens.34
 Although they present it as only an immigration-
related matter, what BELIEVE plan backers have proposed 
is nothing less than a new, mandatory, national ID card. 
Their proposal seeks to skirt the national debate such a 
radical proposal would normally require. It fails to take 
account of problems with the underlying databases that 
will undermine their scheme. It dramatically fails to grap-
ple with the true costs their proposal will impose both on 
the public treasury and on the literally millions of inno-
cent American citizens who will be denied the right to 
work—and suffer losses in pay—until the government 
decides to permit them to be employed. It is telling that a 
similar plan for a British national ID card was one of the 
first things abandoned by the new coalition government 
when it took office in 2010, due to spiraling costs and 
public resistance.  A similar fate likely awaits the BELIEVE 
proposal once the public understands the costs in money, 
privacy, and liberty.
the creation of a card and 
a database that control each 
individual’s right to work will  
give the government new 
leverage over citizens.
32. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
33. See e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987); O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987).
34. There is precedent for denying federal ID documents to people whose be-
havior the government wants to improve: the US Code requires the Secretary 
of State to refuse to issue (and, optionally, to revoke) a passport for anyone 
accused by a state agency of owing $2,500 or more in child support. The statute 
also immunizes the Secretary of State and the US Government for any liability 
for these actions (42 USC 652(k)(2)). Similar rules allow most states to revoke 
drivers or professional licenses held by “deadbeat dads.” The creation of an 
“off” switch on the right to work opens the door to similar measures against 
whoever becomes the disfavored group of the future.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Supporters of the BELIEVE plan would have the nation 
expend huge, untold sums on a new ID card require-
ment that would require every U.S. citizen to be subject 
to biometric capture and to submit to a government 
regulatory scheme under which widespread errors will 
inevitably and wrongfully deny a significant part of the 
U.S. population the ability to work until those errors 
work their way through the system. In return, we will get 
a system of ID cards that will still not prevent fraud, and 
will not end unauthorized employment; at best, it will 
offer criminals a new revenue stream in the provision of 
high-tech identification to unauthorized workers. The 
plan will have significant negative effects on the ability 
of the poorest among us to support themselves, while 
contravening basic American values; offering govern-
ment a new, powerful lever of control over the citizenry; 
and threatening Americans’ privacy. There is no easy 
answer to the question of unauthorized employment in 
the United States.35  The BELIEVE proposal will not 
eliminate the employment of unauthorized workers; it 
will burden all American workers at a time when the 
country can least afford it.
35. Scholars have noted that the lack of job opportunities in sending countries 
and a market for low-skilled labor in countries are part of the root causes of 
economically-driven migration. See Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Logic 
of Illegal Immigration (Council on Foreign Relations 2007).
This report was made possible by generous grants from the Four Freedoms Fund, Ford Foundation and Walter and Evelyn Haas Jr. 
Foundation. We would also like to thank Lisa Chavez, Sarah Lawrence, Sarah Martin and Elaine Mui for their edits and feedback. 
The conclusions contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to our funders.
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tECHNICaL aPPENdIX: 
BeLieVe system Cost ProJeCtions
Catherine Barry*
This appendix outlines the process and assumptions 
used to estimate the costs of a biometric employment 
card. Congressional proposals have been vague, suggesting 
a variety of possible scenarios for a BELIEVE system 
implementation and costs. The costs projected here are 
based on plausible assumptions and benchmarks from 
similar existing programs and accessible government 
projections. Calculations are outlined below, along with 
citations to cost benchmarks and other sources of perti-
nent information. 
Numerical Benchmarks: 
156.35 million workers
The 153.7 civilians in the labor force in June 2010 include 
both employed workers (141.73 million) and unemployed 
workers (14.623 million). In addition, the labor force 
includes 1.4 million in active military in 2009  + 0.25 mil-
lion in the reserves (there were 1 million reservists in 
2009, but 75% reservists hold jobs in the civilian labor 
force according to a 2007 report; including 1 million 
instead of 0.25 million reservists would mistakenly dou-
ble-count civilian workers.)
BLS June 2010 Civilian Labor Force: http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/archives/empsit_07022010.pdf; Active military size 
2009: http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos249.htm; Employment of 
Reservists: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/81xx/doc8114/05-
17-ReserveCallUps.pdf 
20.23 million new entrants total to labor force  
in first 5 years
The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 4.046 million 
new entrants each year; the first 5 years of the BELIEVE 
program will see over 20.23 million new entrants to the 
labor force.
BLS estimate of annual new entrants in U.S. workforce: http://
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/02/art3full.pdf.
 A note about the unemployed: Unemployed persons 
are defined as persons who are actively searching for 
work, but are currently not employed. Thus, they are part 
of the labor force and constitute a cost to the government 
who must provide cards and services related to each per-
son required to participate in the biometric identification 
program. On the other hand, because they are unem-
ployed, the time required to obtain cards and correct 
errors does not constitute a loss for employers; errors and 
other factors associated with the unemployed are not 
included as direct costs to employers.
 A note about the self-employed: The self-employed, 
though they do not fall within the mandate of the pro-
posal, are not excluded from total workforce in the 
calculations presented here. This is because 92-99% of 
self-employed have been shown to be wage workers at 
some point during their lifetime, suggesting that they 
eventually acquire a biometric card.
Self-employed as wage-earners during their lifetime: http://www.
chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspec-
tives/2006/ep_3qtr2006_part2_rissman.pdf
* Catherine Barry is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Demography 
at the University of California at Berkeley.
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GoVErNMENt CoStS—INItIaL SEt-UP aNd Card 
ISSUaNCE, YEarS 0-5
Create federal capacity to verify identities and employ-
ment eligibility.
 Workers must apply to the federal government to 
receive a biometric card.  This application must be done 
in person so that the government can verify a worker’s 
identity and employment eligibility.  There are three 
potential options for existing federal offices that are geo-
graphically dispersed: U.S. Passport offices, U.S. Post 
Offices and Social Security Administration offices.  In 
their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US General 
Accounting Office (US GAO) estimates that 3 staff per-
sons at each port of entry would be necessary to acquire 
biometric measurements and troubleshoot for a proposed 
INItIaL, oNE-tIME CoStS For BELIEVE BIo-Id SYStEM
Costs to the Government (in millions)
Staff training on verifying identities (train 3 staff per 4,500 offices) $67.5
Biometric hardware for passport offices $13.5 to $337.5
Expanded capacity of E-Verify system to accommodate 7.4 million U.S. businesses $1,119
National birth and death registration systems; HHS, SSA, and DHS standardize  
information collected and reported by states
$300
Employer and public education campaigns $410
Cards for 156.35 million employed citizen workers $20,716.4
total initial costs to government $22,626.4 to $22,950.4
Costs to Employers (in millions)
Biometric scanners $153.8
Training on biometric scanners $91.6
Third party employment verification services $5,328.2
total initial costs to employers $5,573.6
Productivity Costs (in millions)
Lost productivity for workers to obtain new card $9,579.5
Cost of errors for worker verifications at federal offices $1,088.8  to $4,355.4
Cost of errors for workers from employer/3rd party service verifications $1,088.8 to $4,355.4
total initial productivity costs $11,757.1 to $18,290.3
totaL INItIaL CoStS $39,957.1 to 46,814.3
Note that these estimates do not include costs for enhanced capacity of Office of Fraud Detection and National Security 
and employer audits.
border security program. Because the proposed bill is 
very similar to the proposed border security program, we 
also assume a scenario of hiring 3 persons at each of 4,500 
US Passport offices, a total estimate of 13,500 new staff. 
(This is likely an underestimate given the 27,000 U.S. Post 
Offices that alternatively could be utilized to administer 
the program. Another alternative scenario could be to uti-
lize office capacity of 1,300 Social Security Administration 
(SSA) offices to verify identities. This option seems less 
viable because of the limited capacity of such a small num-
ber of offices and the time period allotted (5 years) to 
verify the number of workers involved (over 150 mil-
lion)). The 2002 assessment also estimates $5,000 spent 
per staff person to receive training in biometric technol-
ogy. To obtain the final cost projection, we multiply the 
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estimated cost per staff person ($5,000) by the estimated 
number of necessary staff (13,500) for a total cost of $67.5 
million. This is a lower-bound estimate because it does 
not include costs of recruiting applicants and other addi-
tional human resources needs that would be required by 
the initiation of the BELIEVE program. Technology costs 
are included in the section below ‘Expand E-Verify system 
to accommodate 7.4 million employers’ and are not 
reflected here.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment (with number of US 
Passport offices): http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf
Cost of Biometric Hardware for Each Passport office
In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO 
reports that fingerprint machines cost between $1,000 
and $25,000 each. We estimate that each office will 
acquire three machines, one for each staff person trained 
in the technology, for a total of 13,500 machines. This 
reflects a lower-bound estimate, because the government 
may choose to acquire more expensive machines, and/or 
they may choose to acquire more than three machines on 
average at each office. Total estimates range from $ 13.5 
- 337.5 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf
Expand E-Verify System to accommodate 7.4 Million 
Employers
A 2008 US GAO projects a mandatory E-Verify program to 
cost $838 million to accommodate 7.4 million employers 
for years 2009-2012 to the USCIS (U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service). In addition, the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) estimates staff needs for years 2009-
2013 to cost another $281 million. We sum these estimates 
to obtain a baseline for initial BELIEVE program costs 
over a 5-year period. Total estimate: 1,119 million.
US GAO Employment Verification Report 2008 (with total num-
ber of employers): http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08895t.pdf
Establish National Birth and death registration System
Three federal agencies (Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) will work 
together to standardize birth and death information that 
the states collect and report. A 2009 Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) Cost Estimate budgets $150 million for 
DHS to make grants to states to ensure the accuracy of 
birth records. Based on this estimate, we add an addi-
tional $150 million for states to ensure the accuracy of 
death records. Total estimate: $300 million. Set-up costs 
are likely to exceed these conservative estimates because 
of the costs related to coordination among the three 
agencies.
CBO Cost Estimate ‘Providing for Additional Security in States’ 
Identification Act of 2009’: http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/
doc10666/s1261.pdf
Enhance Current Capacity to Prevent Fraud
The proposal is vague regarding enhancing fraud protec-
tion, an extremely important factor related to social 
security/identity cards. What agency would be in charge 
of fraud protection? How much would it cost that agency 
to hire staff and manage programs to prevent identity 
theft and fraud? We intentionally leave this item blank 
because we did not find a suitable benchmark. Leaving 
this cost projection blank will lead to an underestimation 
of total BELIEVE system costs.
random audits of Employers Who deduct  
Employee Wages
Again, the proposal is vague regarding its stipulation on 
conducting audits of employers. How much would it cost 
the agency to hire staff and manage programs to conduct 
audits? How many audits would be conducted per annum? 
We intentionally leave this item blank. Leaving this cost 
projection blank will lead to an underestimation of total 
BELIEVE system costs.
Public Education Campaign
The government will need to educate over 156 million 
workers, along with millions of future workers, on their 
rights and obligations under the BELIEVE system. In 
addition, the campaign will need to educate 7.4 million 
businesses. We used the original public relations cam-
paign budget as reported in a US GAO report for the 
2010 US Census as a benchmark because the U.S. Census 
communications program is a large and expansive pro-
gram designed to educate over 300 million people: 
$410 million.
US GAO 2009 Communications Campaign Has Potential to 
Boost Participation report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09525t.pdf
   Februar y 2 012     |     Hard to BELIEVE: tHE HIgH Cost of a B IomEtrIC IdEntIt y Card14
Cost of Producing Cards for the 156.35 Million Workers
A US GAO 2009 report estimates that expenditures for 
staff plus producing and storing information on biomet-
ric ID cards equals $132.50 per worker enrolled in the 
Transportation Worker Identification Program (TWIC). 
This program is very similar to the proposed BELIEVE 
program; it also requires that biometric identifiers be 
stored on a card to be scanned by potential employers. 
Multiply cost of card ($132.50) by number of workers to 
receive card (156.35 million employed and unemployed) 
for a total cost of $20,716.4. Both employed and unem-
ployed workers will obtain the card to verify their current 
work or obtain future work. 
USGAO 2009 Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
Report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1043.pdf
Cost of Producing Cards for the 20.23 Million Individuals 
Entering the Workforce in First 5 Years
We use the same US GAO 2009 report as mentioned 
above, estimating that expenditures for staff plus produc-
ing and storing information on biometric ID cards equals 
$132.50 per worker enrolled in the Transportation 
Worker Identification Program (TWIC). Multiply cost of 
card ($132.50) by number of new workers to receive card 
during the initial 5-year start-up (20.23 million) for a total 
cost: $2,680.5 million.
USGAO 2009 Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
Report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1043.pdf
EMPLoYEr CoStS—INItIaL SEt-UP aNd Card 
ISSUaNCE, YEarS 0-5
Expenses related to Verifying Work authorization of 
Potential Employees
Purchase of Biometric Scanners
For employers with at least 500 employees, we assume it 
will be more cost effective for the employer to buy biomet-
ric equipment and train employees in-house rather than 
use a third party service. According to a 2007 Small 
Business Association report, the number of businesses 
with at least 500 employees or more was 18,311 in 2007. In 
addition, a 2005 report by the London School of 
Economics on a similar biometric identity program pro-
posed in the United Kingdom estimates that biometric 
scanners to be used by employers for employment 
verification would cost $8,400. Multiply cost ($8,400) by 
the number of employers in the United States with 500 or 
more employees (18,311): $153.8 million. In an alternate 
scenario, the total or partial costs of the scanners could 
fall on the government, but we assume that employers will 
bear the cost.
2005 London School of Economics report ‘The Identity Project’ 
http://is2.lse.ac.uk/idcard/identityreport.pdf; 2007 Business 
Data: http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2007/us_
state_totals_2007.xls
training Employees to Use Biometric Card Scanner
In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO esti-
mates it would cost $5,000 to train each staff person to 
utilize the biometric technology. As mentioned above, we 
assume that it will be more cost effective for large employ-
ers to have an in-house biometric card-scanner. We also 
assume that 18,311 businesses will average 1 staff person 
trained in biometric technology - some businesses will 
have more, but some businesses will have none and opt to 
use a third party business specializing in employment veri-
fication. Multiply training cost ($5,000) by number of 
staff (1) by number of businesses (18,311): $91.6 million. 
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf
Expenses related to Using a third Party Service to 
Verify Work Eligibility of Hired Workers
The 2002 US GAO assessment outlines a biometric airport 
security program in the Netherlands in which users pay 
$89 and go through a 2-stage verification process. First, 
passengers undergo a background check, a passport 
review, and an iris scan. The iris scan and other informa-
tion are encrypted and embedded on a biometric ID card. 
The second phase identifies and verifies each registered 
traveler at the immigration checkpoint. We assume that 
the process and steps described here are comparable to 
the processes to be implemented by a third party service 
as part of the BELIEVE program. We assume that all 
employers with less than 500 employees will opt for this 
program because of the costs involved in staff training 
and acquiring biometric scanning equipment. In 2007, 
59,866,924 people worked for business with less than 500 
employees. Multiply number employed by small busi-
nesses (59,866,924) by the cost per person ($89) for a 
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total cost to small businesses to verify the employment eli-
gibility of their workers: $5,328.2 million. This is 
an underestimate because it does not account for new 
labor force entrants into small businesses during the first 
5 years.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d03174.pdf; Number of persons employed by business with 
less than 500 employees: 2007 Business Data: http://www2.cen-
sus.gov/econ/susb/data/2007/us_state_totals_2007.xls
CoStS to EMPLoYErS aNd WorKErS—INItIaL 
SEt-UP aNd Card ISSUaNCE, YEarS 0-5
Loss of Productivity When Workers take time off  
to Get Card
We assume that employed workers will have to be absent 
from work for 3 hours to obtain their card; this includes 
travel time, wait time, and the time it takes to fill out 
paperwork and scan biometric markers. The average 
hourly wage rate was $22.53 in June 2010; this output will 
be ‘lost’ to employers.  The total number of employed 
workers equals the total number of workers (156.35 mil-
lion) minus the number of unemployed (14.623 million). 
The unemployed workers do not constitute a productivity 
loss for employers because they are not employed by any 
business or entity; therefore they are not included in this 
calculation. Multiply the average hourly wage rate 
($22.53) by the number of hours missed (3) by the num-
ber of employed workers involved (141.73 million).  Total 
estimated cost: $9,579.5 million.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) average hourly wage rate  
June 2010: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_07022010.pdf
Loss of Productivity due to Errors - Current Workers
Errors When taking Biometric Measurements at U.S. 
Passport offices
A 2010 US GAO report on the 2010 US Census revealed a 
22% error rate in fingerprinting acquisition among 
trained employees. We assume that biometric technology 
equipment and training will improve and we estimate a 
very conservative 1% error rate. In addition, we estimate 
that these errors will result in a range of one to four 
weeks’ missed wages because of the time and steps 
involved in correcting errors such as misidentification as 
an individual ineligible to work in the U.S. In this exam-
ple, the worker will need to investigate where the error 
occurred (in the record-keeping of some particular office, 
in the scanning of the biometric markers, in the informa-
tion encrypted in the biometric ID card), and one to four 
weeks to complete these steps is a conservative estimate. 
The June 2010 average weekly wage rate for all workers 
was $768.27. Multiply a 1% (.01) error rate by the number 
of workers (156.35 million) minus the unemployed 
(14.623 million) by the average weekly wage ($768.27) or 
four weeks’ wages (4*768.27) for a total estimated cost of 
$1,088.8 to 4,355.4 million. Unemployed workers are not 
included here because errors and time lost for their card 
acquisition would not constitute a loss for employers. 
Assuming a 1% error rate may lead to underestimates of 
costs involved given that the U.S. Census experienced a 
22% error rate.
US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10430t.pdf; BLS average weekly wage in 2010: http://www.
bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf
Errors When Verifying Employment through third 
Party Services/Place of Employment
In addition to errors that occurred at the U.S. passport 
offices, the same productivity loss may occur during the 
employment eligibility verification process when one of 
the 141.7 million employed workers are verified at their 
current place of employment. We make the same assump-
tions as above in the ‘Errors when taking biometric 
measurements at U.S. passport offices’, replicating the 
cost range of $1,088.8 to 4,355.4 million.
US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10430t.pdf; BLS average weekly wage in 2010: http://www.
bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf
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aNNUaL oPEratING CoStS For BELIEVE BIo-Id SYStEM
Costs to the Government (in millions)
Ongoing Staff training on verifying identities (train 1 staff per 4,500 offices) $22.5
Maintenance of biometric hardware $2.0 to $47.3
Ongoing training of employer obligations $0.46
Annual SSA report to Congress and Biennial GAO report $0.67
Cards for 4 million new workers annually $536.1
Replacement cards for 11.27 million workers annually $1,493.3
total annual costs to government $2,055.0 to $2,100.3
Costs to Employers (in millions)
Maintenance of biometric scanners $21.5
New employee training on biometric scanners $27.7
Third party employment verification services $161.4
total annual costs to employers $210.6
Productivity Costs (in millions)
Lost productivity for 12.08 million workers to replace card $816.5
Cost of errors for over 4 million new hires at employer/3rd party service verifications $31.1 to $124.3
Cost of errors for workers changing jobs $36.4 to $145.6
total annual productivity costs $884.0 to $1,086.4
totaL aNNUaL CoStS $3,149.6 to $3,397.3
Note that these estimates do not include costs for enhanced capacity of Office of Fraud Detection and National Security  
and employer audits.
GoVErNMENt CoStS—oNGoING YEarLY CoStS, 
YEarS 6+ 
ongoing US Passport office Personnel training and  
It Maintenance
In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO esti-
mates a cost of $5,000 to train individual staff persons in 
biometric technology. We assumed earlier that 3 staff per-
sons per office are necessary to initiate the program for 
156.35 million employed and unemployed workers, but 
we assume that ongoing needs will be smaller. We assume 
that after the first 5 years, the initial large staff and budget 
needs will shift to lower ongoing maintenance. We assume 
that 1 staff person will be retained at each of 4,500 US 
Passport offices; this person will require updated training. 
Multiply training costs ($5,000) by number of staff (4,500) 
for a total cost of $ 22.5 million per year.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf
Biometric Machine Maintenance
We earlier assumed that 4,500 U.S. passport offices would 
acquire three biometric machines at $1,000 - 25,000 each. 
The 2002 Technology Assessment report points out that 
maintenance for these smaller machines equals 15% of 
their initial cost and for larger machines the cost equals 
14% of their initial costs. Multiply number of total 
machines (13,500) by their initial cost ($1,000-25,000) by 
their maintenance costs (0.14 or 0.15) for an estimate of 
$2.0 - 47.3 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf
Enhance Current Capacity to Prevent Fraud
The proposal is vague regarding enhancing fraud protec-
tion, an extremely important factor related to social 
security/identity cards. What agency would be in charge 
of fraud protection? How much would it cost that agency 
to hire staff and manage programs to prevent identity 
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theft and fraud? We intentionally leave this item blank 
because we did not find a suitable benchmark. Leaving 
this cost projection blank will lead to an underestimation 
of total BELIEVE system costs.
random audits of Employers Who deduct  
Employee Wages
Again, the proposal is vague regarding its stipulation on 
conducting audits of employers. How much would it cost 
the agency to hire staff and manage programs to conduct 
audits? How many audits would be conducted per annum? 
We intentionally leave this item blank. Leaving this cost 
projection blank will lead to an underestimation of total 
BELIEVE system costs.
ongoing training of Employer obligations,  
Workers rights
We assume that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission will be in charge of training employers and 
workers of their rights and obligations under the BELIEVE 
system. We assume the agency budget for its Education, 
Technical Assistance and Training Revolving fund ($4.617 
million) will increase by 10% (.10) to meet the new needs 
of the BELIEVE system for an estimated cost of $0.46 
million. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Education, 
Technical Assistance and Training Revolving fund: http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2010budget.pdf
Costs of annual SSa report to Congress/Biennial Gao 
report on BELIEVE System
The Social Security Administration (SSA) for 2010-2012 
(3 years) projects the cost of $2 million to audit a variety 
of programs. We divide this number by 3 to obtain a yearly 
audit cost estimate of $0.67 million.
Social Security Administration estimate for audit costs: www.ssa.
gov/oig/recovery/workplan.pdf
Costs of Issuing Free Cards to People Entering Work 
Force For First time
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projects an average 
of 40.46 million new entrants to the labor force over 10 
years; divide 40.46 million by 10 to get an annual estimate 
of individuals entering the workforce for the first time 
each year (4.046 million). Multiply this number by the 
cost of the card per worker ($132.50) to obtain an esti-
mated cost of $536.1 million per year in costs of issuing 
free cards to new workers.
BLS estimate of annual new entrants in U.S. workforce: http://
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/02/art3full.pdf.
Cost of replacement SS Cards to US Citizens
The social security card administration does not currently 
charge fees for replacement cards; the government bears 
the costs. In a 2006 evaluation of the Social Security 
Administration, the US GAO reported that 11.27 million 
replacement cards were issued to US citizens. Multiply the 
number of replacement cards (11.27 million) by the cost 
of the card ($132.50) to obtain an estimate of $1,493.3 
million. 
US GAO 2006 ‘Social Security Administration: Improved Agency 
Coordination Needed for Social Security Card Enhancement 
Efforts’: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06303.pdf; SSA no 
charge for replacement cards: http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10002.
html#cost.
EMPLoYEr CoStS—oNGoING CoStS, YEarS 6+
Maintenance of Biometric Scanners
We earlier assumed that 18,311 employers would acquire 
one biometric scanner at $8,400 each. The 2002 
Technology Assessment report points out that mainte-
nance for biometric machines equals 14% of their initial 
cost. Multiply number of total machines (18,311) by their 
initial cost ($8,400) by 14% (0.14). Total estimated cost: 
$21.5 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf
Yearly training on Biometric Scanners For  
replacement Hires
In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO esti-
mates a cost of $5,000 to train each staff person in 
biometric technology. We earlier assumed that 18,311 
businesses will average 1 staff person trained in biometric 
technology. We also assume that workers will turnover, 
and replacement hires must be trained to use the biomet-
ric technologies. Multiply cost ($5,000) by number of staff 
per business (1) by staff turnover rate (.0303) by number 
of businesses (18,311 million). The number of replace-
ment hires expected based on these calculations is 5,548; 
at $5,000 each, the estimated cost is $27.7 million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf; BLS turnover rate: http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/jolts.pdf
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Expenses related to Using a third Party Service to 
Verify Work Eligibility of Hired Workers
We use the same $89 cost to employers using a third party 
service as described earlier in the section ‘Expenses 
related to using a third party service to verify work eligibil-
ity of hired workers’. Assuming a 3% (.0303) turnover 
rate of the 59,866,924 persons working at businesses with 
fewer than 500 employees, yearly costs projected: $161.4 
million.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03174.pdf; Number of persons employed by business 
with less than 500 employees: 2007 Business Data: http://
www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2007/us_state_totals_2007.
xls; BLS turnover rate: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
jolts.pdf
CoStS to EMPLoYErS aNd WorKErS—oNGoING 
YEarLY CoStS, YEarS 6+
Lost Productivity due to Workers taking time off Work 
to replace Lost/Stolen Card
In a 2006 evaluation, the US GAO reports that the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) issued 12.08 million 
replacement cards in 2005 to citizens and non-citizens. As 
described in earlier sections, we assume that workers will 
have to be absent from work for 3 hours to obtain their 
card; this includes travel time, wait time, and the time it 
takes to fill out paperwork and scan biometric markers. 
The average hourly wage rate was $22.53 in June 2010; 
these wages will be ‘lost’ to workers. Multiply the average 
hourly wage rate ($22.53) by the number of hours missed 
(3) by the number of workers involved (12.08 million) to 
obtain an estimate of $816.5 million.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) average hourly wage rate 2010: 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf; US GAO 
2006 ‘Social Security Administration: Improved Agency 
Coordination Needed for Social Security Card Enhancement 
Efforts’: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06303.pdf
Lost Productivity due to Correcting Errors From U.S. 
Passport offices – New Workers
Not applicable. New hires should have corrected errors 
from US Passport offices when they first acquired the card 
(and they were not working for any employer yet), so we 
assume no lost productivity to employers at this stage.
Lost Productivity due to Correcting Errors with third 
Party/Employer Verification Services - New Workers
As mentioned in earlier sections of this appendix, a 2010 
US GAO report on the 2010 US Census revealed a 22% 
error rate in fingerprinting acquisition among trained 
employees. We assume a 1% error rate as a conservative 
estimate. In addition, we estimate that these errors will 
result in one to four week’s missed wages. The June 2010 
average weekly wages was $768.27. This is again a conser-
vative estimate on the amount of time it would take to go 
through the steps to correct the errors. Multiply a 1% 
(.01) error rate by the number of new workers (4.046 mil-
lion) by the average weekly wage ($768.27); the upper 
range will include 4 weeks of missed wages (4*$768.27). 
Total cost: $ 31.1 to 124.3 million.  Unlike the initial start-
up phase requiring two steps of error correction (at the 
post-office and at the employer/3rd party verification 
site) new workers should possess the card, and have 
already corrected any errors related to the initial acquisi-
tion of the card from the post office.
US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10430t.pdf; BLS estimate of annual new entrants in U.S. 
workforce: http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/02/art3full.pdf
Lost Productivity due to Correcting Errors— 
Worker turnover
The average worker turnover rate is 3.03%; when workers 
change jobs, they must go through the process of match-
ing their biometric markers with their biometric 
identification card for their new employers. We multiply 
the number of currently employed workers (141.7 mil-
lion) by the turnover rate (.0303) by the 1% error rate 
described above (.01) and one to four weeks’ worth of 
wages ($768.27 or 4*768.27) to obtain the costs of errors 
associated with employee turnover. Total estimate: $32.9 
to 131.9 million. 
US GAO 2010 Census report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10430t.pdf; BLS turnover rate: http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/pdf/jolts.pdf
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INItIaL aNd aNNUaL PotENtIaL rEVENUE For BELIEVE BIo-Id SYStEM 
& INItIaL aNd aNNUaL NEt CoStS
Initial revenue: Launch through Year 5 (in millions)
Fees collected from employers for non-citizen worker authorizations $81.9 to $255.8
Fees from noncitizen workers purchasing biometric ID cards $841.2
Fees from legal permanent residents purchasing biometric ID cards $870.5
total Initial revenue $1,793.6 to $1,967.5
annual revenue: Year 6 and later (in millions)
Fees collected from employers for non-citizen worker authorizations $16.4 to $51.2
Fees from noncitizen workers purchasing biometric ID cards $168.3
Fees from legal permanent residents purchasing biometric ID cards $32
total annual revenue $216.7 to $251.5
NEt INItIaL CoStS (CoSt MINUS rEVENUE) $38,163.4 to $44,846.5
NEt aNNUaL CoStS (CoSt MINUS rEVENUE) $2,932.9 to $3,145.8
Note that these estimates do not include revenue from fines for non-compliance.
PotENtIaL rEVENUE SoUrCES: INItIaL SEt-UP aNd 
Card ISSUaNCE, YEarS 0-5
Employment authorization System Fee Issued to 
Employers Who Petition for Non-Citizen Workers
As with employment-based visas, we assume that employ-
ers interested in petitioning for non-citizen workers will 
have to pay a yearly fee to do so. According to public data 
available by the Department of Labor, we calculated that 
51,166 business filed petitions for non-citizen workers in 
2009. Current fees related to immigration-related peti-
tions range from $320 to $1,000. Multiply the potential 
fee ($320 to $1,000) by the number of businesses per year 
(51,166) by the initial 5 year phase to estimate potential 
revenue at $81.9 to $255.8 million.
Department of Labor (DOL) non-citizen petition data: http://
www.flcdatacenter.com/CaseData.aspx; United States Customs 
and Immigration Services Fee Schedule: http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6
d1a/?vgnextoid=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60
aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000
b92ca60aRCRD
Cost of New Card For New Non-Citizens admits
Non-Citizens are the only Persons to be Charged for 
New Biometric Id Cards
In Table 2 of their 2009 report on non-citizen admissions, 
the Department of Homeland Security reports that 1.27 
million non-citizen workers (a combination of workers & 
trainees and intracompany transfers) gained admission to 
the United States to work in 2009. We assume that non-
citizen workers would pay the cost of a biometric 
identification card as described earlier in this appendix 
($132.50). Multiply $132.50 by the number of non-citizen 
admits (1.27 million) to estimate potential revenue from 
this source for one year; the initial setup will take place 
over 5 years, so multiply that number by 5. Potential rev-
enue estimate: $841.4 million.
Non-immigrant admissions to the United States 2009: http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ni_
fr_2009.pdf
Cost of New Card for Currently Present Legal 
Permanent residents (LPrs)
Non-Citizens are the only Persons to be Charged for 
New Biometric Id Cards
First we must estimate the number of LPRs currently 
working in the U.S. We multiply the 12.6 million legal 
permanent residents (LPRs) present in the U.S. currently 
as reported by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) by 0.79 (DHS data on LPRs demonstrate that 
approximately 79% of the LPR group is of working age 
16-65). We assume that LPRs participate in the labor force 
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at similar rates as the total U.S. population, a 66% (0.66) 
participation rate. Multiply 12.6 million LPRs by 79% of 
working age and a 66% labor force participation among 
those of working age. We obtain an estimate of 6.57 mil-
lion LPRs in the labor force who will pay for a biometric 
identification card. This is an underestimate because new 
LPRs entering the labor force during the first 5 years are 
not included here. Revenue estimate: $870.5 million.
Estimates of Legal Permanent Resident Population in 2008: 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_lpr_
pe_2008.pdf; BLS Civilian Labor Force Participation rates by 
age, sex, race and ethnicity: http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_
table_303.htm
Fines Charged to Persons or Entities Subject to the 
Immigration and Nationality act Who do Not Comply 
with this Law
Intentionally left blank. The proposal is vague on what 
the fine might be, how many people may not comply with 
the law, what agency will be in charge of administering 
the fines and the costs of administration. Leaving this 
item blank underestimates net revenue arising from fines 
if the fines collected exceed the cost of administration; 
conversely, leaving this item blank overestimates the net 
revenue arising from fines if fines collected are less than 
the costs of administration.
oNGoING PotENtIaL rEVENUE SoUrCES, YEarS 6+
Employment authorization System Fee Issued to 
Employers Who Petition for Non-Citizen Workers
We assume that employers interested in petitioning for 
non-citizen workers will have to pay a yearly fee to do so. 
According to public data available by the Department of 
Labor, we calculated that 51,166 business filed petitions 
for non-citizen workers in 2009. Current fees related to 
immigration-related petitions range from $320 to $1,000. 
Multiply the potential fee ($320 to $1,000) by the number 
of businesses per year (51,166) to estimate potential 
yearly revenue at $16.4 to 51.2 million.
Department of Labor (DOL) non-citizen petition data: http://
www.flcdatacenter.com/CaseData.aspx; United States Customs 
and Immigration Services Fee Schedule: http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6
d1a/?vgnextoid=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60
aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b1ae408b1c4b3210VgnVCM100000
b92ca60aRCRD
Cost of New Card for New Non-Citizens admits
Non-Citizens are the only Persons to be Charged for 
New Biometric Id Cards
As mentioned above, in Table 2 of their 2009 report on 
non-citizen admissions, the Department of Homeland 
Security reports that 1.27 million non-citizen workers (a 
combination of workers & trainees and intra-company 
transfers) gained admission to the United States to work 
in 2009. We assume that non-citizen workers would pay 
the cost of a biometric identification card as described 
earlier in this appendix ($132.50). Multiply $132.50 by 
the number of non-citizen admits (1.27 million) to esti-
mate potential revenue from this source for one year. 
Potential revenue estimate: $168.3 million.
Non-immigrant admissions to the United States 2009: http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ni_
fr_2009.pdf
Cost of New Card for Newly admitted Legal Permanent 
residents (LPrs)
In 2009, 463,042 LPRs entered the U.S. As previously 
mentioned, we assume that LPRs participate in the labor 
force at similar rates as the U.S. population, a 66% (.66) 
participation rate.  DHS data on LPRs demonstrate that 
approximately 79% (.79) of the LPR group is of working 
age 16-65. Multiply number of admitted LPRs (463,042) 
by percentage of working age (.79) by the labor force par-
ticipation rate (.66) to obtain an estimated 241,430 of 
LPRs annually who will need to obtain a BIOID card. 
Multiply this number by the cost of a new card ($132.50) 
for $32 million in potential revenue.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
lpr_fr_2009.pdf
Fines Charged to Persons or Entities Subject to the 
Immigration and Nationality act Who do Not Comply  
with this Law
Left intentionally blank. The proposal is vague on what 
the fine might be, how many people may not comply with 
the law, what agency will be in charge of administering 
the fines and the costs of administration. Leaving this 
item blank underestimates net revenue arising from fines 
if the fines collected exceed the cost of administration; 
conversely, leaving this item blank overestimates the net 
revenue arising from fines if fines collected are less than 
the costs of administration.
